Boeing’s Starliner was meant to become America’s second independent way of transporting astronauts to the International Space Station. But the story of this spacecraft increasingly looks less like an ordinary delay and more like a revealing example of how major space programs collide with the hard realities of engineering.
As we watch the difficulties and failures surrounding Artemis, Starship HLS, Moonbase, and New Glenn, it is worth taking a closer look at another large and troubled NASA program: Boeing’s development of the crewed Starliner spacecraft under its contract with NASA.
This was not a fantasy project or a reckless gamble. It was supposed to be a rational and necessary element of American human spaceflight. After NASA ended its dependence on Russian Soyuz spacecraft, the agency needed two independent American crew transportation systems. One was SpaceX Crew Dragon. The other was Boeing Starliner. If one spacecraft ran into trouble, the other was supposed to provide a backup route to orbit.
But reality proved far more difficult than the original plans suggested. Crew Dragon has long since become an operational system for regularly transporting crews to the ISS. Starliner, after many years of development, testing, and rework, still has not become a fully operational spacecraft.
Between Presentation and Real Operation
The problems now surrounding Artemis, Starship HLS, Moonbase, and New Glenn are not exceptions or accidental failures by individual companies. They reveal a general feature of large space programs: between presentations, contracts, political deadlines, and the actual operation of complex hardware lies a zone of harsh engineering reality.
That is why announced dates in such programs should be treated with great caution. A schedule may look confident, the architecture may seem logical, the funding may be substantial, and the hopes may appear well founded. But every new spacecraft, launch vehicle, landing system, or orbital infrastructure element must pass not a presentation, but real testing. That is where weaknesses become visible.
The history of Boeing Starliner has become one of the clearest examples of this. The hopes placed in it were real and justified. It was a needed spacecraft, intended to give NASA backup access to the ISS. But the outcome has been far harsher than one might have expected at the start of the program.
Starliner does not launch on a Boeing rocket. It launches on United Launch Alliance’s Atlas V. For Starliner, ULA uses a special crew-rated configuration known as Atlas V N22. It has no standard payload fairing: the Starliner capsule itself sits on top and serves as the protected upper element. The rocket has two solid rocket boosters and a dual-engine Centaur upper stage. Starliner is attached to the rocket through a special adapter with an aerodynamic skirt that reduces loads during ascent through the atmosphere.
This is an important point. Starliner is not simply a capsule that can be moved tomorrow to any other rocket. It is a certified combination of spacecraft, launch vehicle, emergency detection system, ground infrastructure, preparation procedures, and flight trajectory. Atlas V was specially adapted for Starliner’s crewed missions.
An Expensive Stack: Spacecraft, Rocket, and the Limits of Reusability
Boeing Starliner atop ULA’s Atlas V rocket — a transportation system intended to provide NASA with a second independent American crew route to the International Space Station.
Image credit: Boeing
Atlas V itself is a reliable but expendable rocket. Its first stage does not return, unlike Falcon 9, which launches Crew Dragon. Falcon 9 is a partially reusable system: after launch, the first stage returns, while the second stage remains expendable. Crew Dragon itself is also partially reusable: the pressurized capsule returns to Earth and can fly again after servicing, while the unpressurized cargo section, known as the trunk, separates before atmospheric reentry and burns up.
Starliner was also conceived as a reusable spacecraft, but with the same important limitation. Its command module — the capsule — is reusable, and Boeing expects it to be used up to ten times. The service module, however, which contains the main power systems and engines, is expendable and separates before the capsule returns to Earth.
So the difference between the two systems is not that one spacecraft is reusable and the other is not. Both Crew Dragon and Starliner have reusable capsules and expendable service elements. The key difference lies in the launch vehicle. SpaceX reuses both the spacecraft and the most expensive part of the rocket — the Falcon 9 first stage. Boeing reuses only the Starliner capsule, while the costly Atlas V is lost completely on every flight.
This is why Boeing’s transportation system turns out to be significantly more expensive than SpaceX’s. NASA’s Office of Inspector General made this clear in its estimates. In 2019, the NASA inspector general estimated the average seat cost at roughly $90 million for Starliner and roughly $55 million for Crew Dragon. This is not a simple ticket price, but a calculation based on the Commercial Crew contract model. Still, the comparison is striking: a seat on Starliner came out about 60% more expensive than a seat on Crew Dragon. In other words, not literally twice as expensive, but the gap was very large.
The problem is made worse by the fact that Atlas V itself is approaching the end of its operational life. United Launch Alliance no longer sells new Atlas V launches, production of the rocket is effectively winding down, and the company’s future is tied to Vulcan Centaur. Atlas V rockets had been reserved for Starliner, so the nearest possible flights can still, in theory, take place on Atlas V N22. But this does not mean Starliner has a long future on that launch vehicle. It only means that specific rockets were set aside for already planned missions.
Crew Flight Test and the Narrow Window Before 2030
After the Crew Flight Test in 2024, the situation became even more complicated. The mission launched on June 5, 2024, with two NASA astronauts — Butch Wilmore and Suni Williams. It was supposed to last roughly eight to fourteen days, but because of anomalies in the spacecraft’s propulsion system, Starliner remained docked to the ISS for more than three months. It docked with the station on June 6, 2024, and undocked without its crew on September 6. Instead of spending the planned 8–14 days at the ISS, the spacecraft remained there for about 92 days.
Boeing’s Starliner spacecraft approaches the International Space Station during the uncrewed Orbital Flight Test-2 mission in May 2022.
Image credit: NASA / Johnson Space Center
NASA eventually decided to return Starliner to Earth without the crew. The astronauts, who had been expected to spend only a few days in space, remained in orbit for 286 days and returned to Earth not on Starliner, but aboard SpaceX’s Crew Dragon as part of the Crew-9 mission in March 2025.
In February 2026, NASA released its investigation report on the mission. The investigation showed that the problem was not a single failure. The mission brought together technical malfunctions, insufficiently tested propulsion-system operating modes, management mistakes, and problems of organizational culture — in other words, the way the program assessed risks, discussed warning signs, and made decisions.
NASA classified the incident as a Type A mishap — the highest severity category in this kind of assessment system, even though there were no deaths or injuries. This means the agency recognized the potential for a far more serious outcome. For a human spaceflight program, this is a very serious signal: the problem was not limited to a single valve or thruster, but involved the entire system of verification, management, and decision-making.
After that, NASA and Boeing modified the contract. Initially, Boeing was expected to carry out up to six post-certification Starliner flights to the ISS. The firm commitment has now been reduced to four missions, with two more left only as options. The next flight, Starliner-1, is planned as an uncrewed cargo flight to the ISS. It is needed not as a routine operational mission, but as an additional test of modifications made after the problems encountered during the Crew Flight Test.
As of May 2026, NASA says launch opportunities for the uncrewed Starliner-1 mission remain under review. Teams continue working on technical issues identified during the 2024 Crew Flight Test and on the final actions following the investigation report. In other words, Starliner has still not returned to a normal flight schedule.
Here another constraint appears: time. The International Space Station is planned to operate until 2030. The United States, Japan, Canada, and the ESA member states have already confirmed participation in station operations through that date. According to NASA, Russia has committed to continued operations at least until 2028. After the station’s operational life ends, it is to be deorbited in a controlled manner using a special vehicle being developed for NASA by SpaceX.
This means Starliner’s window is very narrow. First, Boeing and NASA must conduct the uncrewed Starliner-1 mission. Then the spacecraft must receive certification. Only after that will Starliner be able to fly crew rotation missions. In theory, NASA speaks of the possibility of up to three crew rotation flights after a successful Starliner-1. In practice, given the time needed for the uncrewed verification flight, certification, and the end of ISS operations in 2030, the real window could shrink to one or two missions — or disappear altogether if new delays continue.
At this point, the main question is no longer only the spacecraft’s technical condition. If Starliner is certified too late, it will enter service near the end of the ISS’s lifetime. Its main customer — the station for which it was created — is approaching the end of operations. And the transition to private orbital stations has not yet created any guaranteed market for Starliner.
The Dead End in Numbers
This story is hard to complete without the financial side. The money is what shows how revealing the Starliner project has become.
NASA’s contracts with Boeing and SpaceX under the Commercial Crew Transportation Capability program were announced on September 16, 2014. Boeing received a contract with a maximum value of $4.2 billion; SpaceX received $2.6 billion. Both companies were expected to create certified crew transportation systems for flights to the ISS. At the time, NASA hoped to end its dependence on Russian Soyuz spacecraft by 2017.
Almost twelve years have passed. SpaceX, which received the smaller initial contract, was the first to bring its system into operation. The uncrewed Crew Dragon Demo-1 successfully flew to the ISS in March 2019. The first crewed Demo-2 mission launched in May 2020. By the autumn of 2020, Crew Dragon had become NASA’s regular transportation spacecraft.
Starliner followed a very different path. The first uncrewed Orbital Flight Test in December 2019 failed to reach the ISS. The repeat uncrewed flight, OFT-2, took place only in May 2022. The first crewed Crew Flight Test launched in June 2024, almost ten years after the contract was awarded, and ended with the spacecraft returning without its crew. As of 2026, Starliner still has not become an operational transportation system.
NASA’s Office of Inspector General had already shown the financial gap in 2019. The cost of a seat on Starliner was estimated at roughly $90 million, while a seat on Crew Dragon was estimated at roughly $55 million. In other words, a seat on Boeing’s spacecraft came out about 60% more expensive than a seat on SpaceX’s spacecraft.
The same estimates show the difference in development and testing costs. According to the NASA inspector general, the development and testing portion of the program cost roughly $2.2 billion for Boeing and $1.2 billion for SpaceX. Starliner was therefore already more expensive before it was supposed to enter regular service.
After that, the trajectories of the two programs fully diverged. NASA continued buying additional SpaceX missions because Crew Dragon was actually flying and providing access to the ISS. The total value of SpaceX’s contract, after additional orders, rose to nearly $4.93 billion. But this money now pays not just for development, but for a large package of regular flights to the station through 2030.
Boeing’s situation is the opposite. Because of the fixed-price contract, a significant portion of the overruns fell not on NASA, but on the company itself. In 2024, Boeing recognized $523 million in losses on the Commercial Crew program in just one year. Based on Boeing’s own reporting, the company’s cumulative losses on Starliner have already approached $2 billion. These are funds Boeing had to put in above the government contract because of delays, technical problems, and additional testing.
After the problems during the Crew Flight Test, NASA and Boeing modified the contract. The guaranteed number of Starliner missions was reduced: instead of six post-certification flights, only four remain firm, while two more are only options. According to Reuters, the value of Boeing’s contract after the modification fell by $768 million to $3.732 billion, while NASA had already paid about $2.2 billion under the contract data.
This is the financial paradox of Starliner. From the start, NASA awarded Boeing more money than SpaceX, but the operational transportation system came from SpaceX. Crew Dragon, built under the smaller initial contract, became the regular spacecraft for ISS flights. Starliner, after almost twelve years, billions of dollars in government funding, and roughly two billion dollars in Boeing’s own losses, still needs another uncrewed flight to confirm its upgrades.
From a financial point of view, the program already looks like a severe example of how even a large contract, an experienced corporation, and a rational goal do not guarantee a working result.
The Starliner Trap
Could Starliner fly on Falcon 9? On paper, Starliner was once considered a spacecraft potentially compatible with several launch vehicles. But the real certified system exists specifically in combination with Atlas V N22. Moving Starliner to Falcon 9 would require a new integration effort, a new adapter, new load calculations, a new abort logic, new testing, and a new NASA certification process. On top of that, Falcon 9 belongs to Boeing’s direct competitor, SpaceX, which already has its own successful spacecraft, Crew Dragon. Technically, such a scheme would not be a simple rocket swap. Economically and organizationally, it would look almost pointless.
The situation with Vulcan Centaur is also far from simple. It is ULA’s future primary rocket, but it is not a certified crew launch system for Starliner. Moving the spacecraft to Vulcan would require a separate integration and certification program. For a spacecraft that has still not entered regular service, and whose main target station is scheduled to operate only until 2030, that would be a very difficult economic decision.
In the end, Starliner has found itself in a trap. The spacecraft was created as America’s second independent route to the ISS. But the first route — Crew Dragon — has long been operational, costs less, and relies on a partially reusable launch-and-spacecraft system. Starliner, by contrast, remains tied to an expensive expendable rocket that is itself nearing retirement, while the spacecraft is still making its way from testing to certification.
NASA is not abandoning Starliner, because having a backup American crew transportation system remains fundamentally important to the agency. But time is working against the program. Before 2030, Starliner may still manage to fly several missions — but only if Starliner-1 succeeds, certification follows quickly, and no new major delays arise.
If the problems continue, the spacecraft risks remaining not a fully operational transportation system, but an expensive example of how technical difficulties, a costly launch vehicle, corporate inertia, and shifting timelines can undermine even a genuinely necessary idea: backup access to orbit.
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